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Background: As the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic develops, healthcare professionals are looking for support
with, and guidance to inform, the difficult decisions they face. In the (current) absence of an authoritative national
steer in England, professional bodies and local organisations have been developing and disseminating their own
ethical guidance. Questions inevitably arise, some of which are particularly pressing during the pandemic, as events
are unfolding quickly and the field is becoming crowded. My central question here is: which professional ethical
guidance should the professional follow?
Main body: Adopting a working definition of “professional ethical guidance”, I offer three domains for a healthcare
professional to consider, and some associated questions to ask, when determining whether – in relation to any
guidance document – they should “bin it or pin it”. First, the professional should consider the source of the
guidance: is the issuing body authoritative or, if not, at least sufficiently influential that its guidance should be
followed? Second, the professional should consider the applicability of the guidance, ascertaining whether the
guidance is available and, if so, whether it is pertinent. Pertinence has various dimensions, including whether the
guidance applies to this professional, this patient and/or this setting, whether it is up-to-date, and whether the
guidance addresses the situation the professional is facing. Third, the professional should consider the methodology
and methods by which the guidance was produced. Although the substantive quality of the guidance is important,
so too are the methods by which it was produced. Here, the professional should ask whether the guidance is
sufficiently inclusive – in terms of who has prepared it and who contributed to its development – and whether it
was rigorously developed, and thus utilised appropriate processes, principles and evidence.
Conclusion: Asking and answering such questions may be challenging, particularly during a pandemic.
Furthermore, guidance will not do all the work: professionals will still need to exercise their judgment in deciding
what is best in the individual case, whether or not this concerns COVID-19. But such judgments can and should be
informed (and constrained) by guidance, and hopefully these preliminary observations will provide some useful
pointers for time-pressed professionals.
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Background
“Guidelines for medical management are now part
of medical life. A fool – loosely defined as someone
who does not know much about a particular area of
medicine – will do well to follow guidelines when
treating patients, but a wise man (again, loosely de-
fined as someone who does know about the disease
in question) might do better not to follow them
slavishly” [1].
As the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic develops,
even “wise” healthcare professionals are – understand-
ably – looking for support with, and guidance to inform,
the difficult decisions they face. In the UK, as elsewhere,
there has been extensive recent activity, nationally, re-
gionally and locally, but – until 1 April 2020 – national
ethical guidance was conspicuous by its absence. April
then saw the publication of two key documents offering
professional ethical guidance related to COVID-19. The
Royal College of Physicians (RCP) led the way [2], with
the support of numerous other bodies, followed shortly
thereafter by the British Medical Association (BMA) [3].
Hopefully such guidance will prove useful to clinicians
on the front-line and will help to promote the interests
of not only individual patients, but also the wider popu-
lation. However, questions will also arise. Who should
have the responsibility – and authority – to issue such
guidance? What is the status and import of this guid-
ance? Are the different guidance documents consistent
– and should they be? And if guidance does conflict,
which (if any) should take priority?
These sorts of questions had been brought sharply into
focus for me during an ongoing (but, necessarily, inter-
rupted) research project that explores treatment deci-
sions for incapacitated patients, as my collaborators and
I were struck by the plethora of guidance for health and
social care professionals working for and with such indi-
viduals [4]. This is far from the only context in which (ac-
tual or purported) guidance proliferates; others might be
reminded of pre- (and presumably post-) COVID-19 ef-
forts to issue guidance pertaining to artificial intelligence
(AI), including its deployment in healthcare.
The issue returns now, with considerable force, as
various organisations are publishing or preparing guid-
ance on ethical patient care during COVID-19. Informal
discussions with colleagues indicate that everyone appre-
ciates the need for such guidance, but most are keen to
avoid unnecessary duplication, whilst also recognising
that discrete guidance might be needed for different pa-
tient groups, professionals, settings and contexts. So
how should the presumed audiences of the guidance –
such as healthcare professionals – navigate this cluttered
terrain? In the following, my focus is on professional
ethical guidance in the UK, which I will attempt to de-
fine momentarily, and specifically on guidance pertain-
ing to medical (or healthcare) ethics; although the
COVID-19 pandemic has provided the spur, many of
the observations will apply beyond this specific context.
Bin it or pin it?
What is professional ethical guidance?
First, it is worth briefly reflecting on what counts as pro-
fessional ethical guidance. Medical ethics (or, more
broadly, healthcare ethics or, even more broadly, bioeth-
ics) is an applied, multi- and inter-disciplinary field.
Some argue that the field is fundamentally concerned
with issuing “practical oughts” i.e. making convincing
claims that actually serve to convince the relevant stake-
holders ([5], p. 57). Medical ethics therefore aspires to
make a difference in the “real world” and, on this sort of
account, everything issued in the name of “medical eth-
ics” can be considered “guidance” in a sense.
But “medical ethics” is a broad field, populated and
produced by diverse actors. Professional ethical guidance
occupies a distinct sector of the field. Taking each word
individually, this: (1) is aimed at (particular) profes-
sionals and (typically) prepared and issued by profes-
sional organisations; (2) is ethical insofar as it articulates
what should be done or which attitudes should be culti-
vated; and (3) aspires to guide the clinical practice of the
professionals to whom it is addressed.
Sometimes, as with the recent RCP and BMA docu-
ments, professional ethical guidance will be explicitly la-
belled as such. But even guidance that does not
explicitly talk of “ethics” is likely implicitly to rest on –
or advance – particular value commitments or presup-
positions. However, failure to engage explicitly with eth-
ics might mean that, however inadvertently, important
values are missed. For example, the first version of NICE’s
rapid guidelines on critical care during COVID-19 made
no direct reference to ethics [6]. Unfortunately, the guide-
lines appeared to invite judgments against some individ-
uals with long-term disabilities that were considered
unjustly discriminatory; following legal challenge, the
guidelines were re-drafted, although the second version
also omits any direct reference to ethics [7, 8].
Here, however, I essentially focus on the former i.e.
professional guidance that is explicitly articulated as eth-
ical in nature and import. It is nevertheless worth ac-
knowledging that the identification of “ethical” guidance
will not always be straightforward. The potential for
confusion can be further compounded by the variety of
terms used to describe such documents – what (if any)
are the differences between guidance, guidelines, proto-
cols, pathways, Codes of Practice, and the like? What-
ever the relevant document might be called, however,
Huxtable BMC Medical Ethics           (2020) 21:60 Page 2 of 10
my central question here is: which guidance (etc.) should
the professional follow?
Which professional ethical guidance should I follow?
There are mixed practical, prudential and ethical reasons
for ensuring that healthcare professionals know which
guidance they should follow. Knowing which guidance
to follow will, for example, help to ensure that profes-
sionals are clear about they are expected to do and how
to do it, consistent in their practices, and that those prac-
tices are defensible, because they take due account of
pertinent facts and values, including ethical values.
But how should a professional determine which spe-
cific guidance is for them – and, by extension, their pa-
tients or service users? There appear to be various
factors for a professional to consider when determining
whether this or that guidance is the one for them i.e.
whether the professional should, as Norman put it in a
2013 blog, “consign it to the bin, or to pin it to the no-
tice board with fairy lights around it” [9].
Norman cites a 2012 ruling, which examined local
guidance concerning the mobility of the visually im-
paired, in which Kenneth Parker J said:
“In my view, the weight that should be given to par-
ticular guidance depends upon the specific context
in which the guidance has been produced. In par-
ticular (without intending to create an exhaustive
list) I believe that it is necessary to give due regard
to the authorship of the guidance, the quality and in-
tensity of the work done in the production of the
guidance, the extent to which the (possibly compet-
ing) interests of those who are likely to be affected
by the guidance have been recognised and weighed,
the importance of any more general public policy
that the guidance has sought to promote, and the ex-
press terms of the guidance itself” ([10], para 39.).
Whilst not exhaustive, these observations strike in the
right direction. Drawing on them, the following offers an
attempt to map some of the pertinent factors and ques-
tions to ask, on which I hope others will be inclined to
build. The factors are organised into three domains: (1)
the source of the guidance; (2) the applicability of the
guidance; and (3) the methodology and methods by
which the guidance was produced.
The source of the guidance
First, the professional should consider the source of the
guidance i.e. the provenance of the guidance and thus
the authors to whom Kenneth Parker J referred. A key
question to ask here is:
 How authoritative is the source of the guidance?
Given its provenance, some guidance will be authorita-
tive and, indeed, non-negotiable and binding. Legal guid-
ance – deriving from primary legal sources, like Acts of
Parliament or judges’ rulings, and secondary sources, like
Regulations or Codes of Practice – will typically fall into
this category. So too will (“quasi-legal”) guidance that is
issued by the professional’s regulator, which occupies
what Miola calls the “formal” sector of ethical discourse
([11], p. 6).
Guidance from, for example, the General Medical
Council (GMC) will therefore be authoritative for (and
over) doctors. As the BMA explains,
“The GMC decide which doctors are able and quali-
fied to work in the UK, set the standards that doctors
must follow throughout their career, and take action
when those standards have not been met” [12].
Indeed, guidance issued by the GMC has sometimes
been cited with approval in, and has correspondingly in-
formed, the law [13]. Failure to heed the guidance (in-
deed, edicts) of the law or the regulator would not be
prudent, since this may lead to loss of liberty or liveli-
hood. The same might be said of guidance that is issued
by employers. As such, one way of discerning the au-
thority of guidance involves identifying the possible ram-
ifications of failing to comply.
Turning specifically to COVID-19, professionals
should be guided by the pronouncements and principles
emanating from the law and professional regulators.
Some of these will be well-established and should
already be familiar to professionals, although the pan-
demic has also prompted some revisions to the law in
England and Wales [14]. As yet, however, no authorita-
tive position has been taken in England and Wales on
some of the thornier ethical questions that COVID-19
might pose, for example, about how medical resources
such as ventilators in ICU should be allocated, should
the need to make such decisions arise.
COVID-19 raises a myriad of such questions, including
about patients who do not have the virus, but who still
need treatment, care and support, and whose needs
should not be entirely clouded by the “COVID fog”, as a
clinical colleague has so vividly expressed it [15]. Ideally
there would be ethical guidance from an authoritative
source, such as the Government, through the Department
of Health, Chief Medical Officer (CMO) or similar author-
ity [15–19]. Scotland has issued such guidance, which
clearly conveys the pertinent ethical principles and signals
the need for clinical ethics support during the pandemic
[20]. That document does not offer detailed practical pro-
tocols, but it does offer a useful framework, although its
publication has been rather overshadowed by events con-
cerning the (then) Scottish CMO [21].
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England and Wales currently lack such a statement, so
professional, regional and local organisations are step-
ping in to fill the gap. Notwithstanding the merits of the
guidance that is emerging here (and, indeed, internation-
ally), the COVID ethics field is becoming crowded [22],
but the available guidance lacks the overt authority of
the Scottish statement. Where this is the case, the pro-
fessional might next ask:
 How influential is the source of the guidance?
Although they fall short of having binding authority,
other sources will still be highly influential, meaning
their guidance is likely to be worth heeding.1 This may
be particularly true of those organisations that have in-
fluence over any authoritative position that is adopted;
where this is the case, prudence might again be a
motivator.
Miola has referred to a “semi-formal” sector of ethical
discourse, occupied by the BMA and Royal Colleges
[11]. The BMA is not only “the largest registered trade
union” for UK doctors, but also works.
“with governments to lobby for improvements to
health care. Also a professional body, the BMA
leads debate on ethical, scientific and public health
matters through research and publications” [12].
The BMA may be the largest union, but it is not the
only one, which necessarily implies that there will be
non-members to whom its guidance might appear su-
perfluous. Even BMA members might wonder whether
they should or must always heed its guidance. But both
members and non-members would be advised to recog-
nise the esteem in which the BMA, and its ethical guid-
ance, is held and to appreciate its influence over
professional medical practice. As the above statement
suggests, the BMA has the ear of Government and “leads
debate”. In doing so, as some judges have noted, the
BMA will of course seek to heed the law and convey im-
portant legal messages to its audience [23]. But some-
times the influence will extend in the opposite direction,
with BMA guidance informing the authoritative legal
position, such as when a court approves or adopts par-
ticular guidance as reflective of the legal position [24].
Similar observations may be made about the Royal
Colleges. As the BMA explains, these.
“are professional membership bodies that you can
join … dependent on your area of practise. They
support fellows and members throughout their car-
eer, work to advance standards and improve patient
care, and develop policy and guidance” [12].
Membership might be required at some career stages
– for example, when undergoing specialist training –
but not every professional will be or will remain a mem-
ber of the relevant College. However, like the BMA, the
Royal Colleges can also “inform” the authoritative pos-
ition ([25], para. 12).
Even organisations that have less overt influence over
any authoritative position that is adopted might still
have influence in practice. The Nuffield Council on Bio-
ethics, for example, is “an independent body that in-
forms policy and public debate about the ethical
questions raised by biological and medical research”, but
it has no official status as such [26]. Despite this, I
understand from clinical colleagues that the detailed
guidance it issues on a range of topics has been used to
inform clinical practice.
As such, even where the source is not strictly authori-
tative, what it says may have a bearing on any authorita-
tive position, or otherwise prove influential in shaping
professional practice.
The applicability of the guidance
Second, the professional should consider the applicabil-
ity of the guidance by looking, as Kenneth Parker J sug-
gests, to “the express terms of the guidance itself”. In
short, the guidance should be capable of doing what it
sets out to do i.e. guiding professional practice.
A first key question to ask is:
 Is the guidance accessible?
This is self-evident and need not be laboured: if guid-
ance is meant to guide, those who are to be guided need
to be able to locate it.2 Fortunately, the internet can help
with accessibility but, even so, the guidance will need to
be clearly signposted to those who need it and not hid-
den away. However, open access and clear signposting is
unlikely to be sufficient. As COVID-19 unfolds, the
digital landscape threatens to become congested, as
1My focus here is on guidance issued by professional organisations, but
I recognise that other groups or even individuals might also have
influence, given (for example) the esteem in which they are held or the
networks in and with which they work. Whatever the source of the
guidance, authority and influence are not the only factors to consider:
the other domains (below) offer further suggestions for assessing the
soundness of the proposals issued.
2This recalls one of Fuller’s conditions for the “Internal morality of
law” – promulgation – which need to be observed if law is to fulfil its
goal of guiding human behaviour via rules [27]. The other conditions
are that legal rules should be general (as opposed to specific edicts),
prospective, clear, non-contradictory, relatively constant, and not re-
quire the impossible, and that there should be congruence between the
rules as stated and applied. Given their action-guiding orientation,
these requirements might usefully be heeded by professional ethical
guidance too, albeit adjusted to suit such guidance, rather than the dic-
tates of law per se.
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various bodies – national, regional and local – publish
their guidance. Ideally, as noted above, there would be
national leadership, offering a uniform clear message,
which would minimise the risks of inconsistency, confu-
sion or (simply) unnecessary searching by professionals
who will be under considerable strain. In the absence of
an authoritative national steer, bodies drafting guidance
would be advised to co-ordinate and streamline their ef-
forts as best they can.
Whether or not the guidance results from a national
conversation, once the professional has obtained it, she
or he will need to be able to act on it. Here a second key
question arises:
 Is the guidance pertinent?
There are various dimensions to the question of per-
tinence, raising (at least) five further questions to ask
and answer. First, is the guidance meant to apply to this
professional? Obviously, guidance directed at doctors –
or specific groups thereof – might not be pertinent to
others.
Second, does the guidance apply to the particular pa-
tient or group of patients in question? Whilst some eth-
ical norms and principles will be applicable to different
people with different conditions, guidance dealing with,
for example, children and young people will not – with-
out further work – be equipped to inform the profes-
sional practice of geriatricians.
Third, does the guidance apply in the relevant setting
– clinical and/or geographical? During COVID-19, there
is likely to be guidance targeted specifically towards in-
tensive care settings, but alternative guidance is likely to
be needed for those working in other settings (such as
home care). Equally, there may be jurisdictional or other
geographical considerations: guidance for Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland might not be applicable
in England, and so too guidance directed at, for example,
urban locales might have less pertinence in a rural
setting.
Fourth, is the guidance up to date? Temporality mat-
ters: some guidance might well stand the test of time –
note, for example, how emerging COVID-19 guidance
builds on principles first articulated in relation to the
2009 flu pandemic [28] – but other guidance will, if it is
not updated or is superseded, fall into redundancy or de-
suetude. As COVID-19 poignantly demonstrates, the
world can move on quickly, meaning guidance might
need to be revised to reflect changing circumstances.
Finally, and linked to the last point, does the guidance
in question address the situation the professional is fa-
cing? Sometimes a document will offer guiding princi-
ples, which might prove helpful in the absence of any
more specific pointers. However, on other occasions, the
guidance might fail significantly or entirely to point the
professional towards an answer to their particular ques-
tion or dilemma.
In summary, no matter how authoritative or influential
the issuing body, if the purported guidance is inaccess-
ible or not pertinent, it will not be capable of applica-
tion, in which case professionals will need to look
elsewhere for the answers they seek.
The methodology and methods by which the guidance was
produced
The professional should next consider the methodology
and methods which led to the production of the guid-
ance.3 This may be challenging, particularly when time
is scarce, as is likely to be the case during a pandemic.
The task may be harder still if the guidance is insuffi-
ciently transparent about the processes that led to its
creation. However, where possible, as Kenneth Parker J
puts it, account should be taken of “the quality and in-
tensity of the work done”.
The “quality of the work” can be judged in different
ways. The substantive quality or legitimacy of the guid-
ance that is produced will be a consideration. Whether
the guidance gets it “right” – and how this might be
judged – are undoubtedly important questions. For ex-
ample, COVID-19 threatens to raise (inter alia) thorny
questions of resource allocation and distributive justice,
and concerns have already been raised about the defens-
ibility of the principles and positions offered in some na-
tional guidance [29]. However, here (returning to
Kenneth Parker J’s phrasing) I will focus on the quality
“of the work done” to produce the guidance. The quality
of the process cannot guarantee the quality of the prod-
uct, but it might at least offer an indication in this direc-
tion. A key question to ask here is:
 Is the guidance appropriately inclusive?
Guidance should be appropriately inclusive, in terms
of who prepares it and who contributes to its devel-
opment. First, the group that prepares the guidance
should reflect the range of experiences, perspectives
and expertise that will be needed to address the topic
3Whilst a discursive piece such as this one seldom includes an outline
of method, in the spirit of what follows, I should acknowledge here the
method by which I prepared this article. As the guidance landscape in
the UK became increasingly cluttered and difficult to navigate, I
discerned a need for “guidance” on selecting guidance. Clinical
colleagues confirmed the growing need, so I elected to undertake a
rapid narrative review, via Google (and Google Scholar) searches. In
less time-pressed circumstances, a more robust approach would be
followed, drawing on expert advice about the search strategy. The art-
icle should be read accordingly i.e. as a discursive piece, and acknow-
ledging the rapidity and the subjectivity inherent in the method by
which it was prepared.
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at hand.4 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics indicates
how it seeks to capture the relevant range of voices:
“For each in-depth inquiry that we undertake, we
convene a multi-disciplinary working group. We ap-
point a Chair and work with them to appoint work-
ing group members from a range of disciplines (for
example, science, law, theology, philosophy, indus-
try)” [30].
Second, in developing its position, the group should
ensure it listens to the relevant stakeholders. As Kenneth
Parker J says, guidance can be judged by “the extent to
which the (possibly competing) interests of those who
are likely to be affected by the guidance have been
recognised and weighed”. Those affected by the guidance
should have their voices heard and heeded, perhaps as
members of the issuing group, but certainly as contribu-
tors to its work. Returning to the Nuffield Council, its
in-depth inquiries strive to hear from a range of people
with experience, via meetings or written submissions [30].
As recent events have shown, failure to heed the maxim
“Nothing about us without us!” will understandably pro-
voke criticism and may necessitate revision [29, 31].
Even if not every stakeholder is able to help draft or
inform the guidance, care will still be needed to ensure
that their opinions and interests are accounted for. This
leads on to further considerations of evidence and
process, captured by a second overarching question:
 Was the guidance rigorously developed?
Rigour, too, has different dimensions. Amongst the
questions to ask are: has the guidance been developed
through an appropriate process? The processes might
vary by organisation, but some sort of process will be
needed – as will transparency about what this involves.
NICE, for example, is legally required “to have, and con-
sult on, procedures for giving advice or guidance, and
making recommendations”, which it conveys via detailed
process and methods manuals [32].
Next, what are the principles which informed the de-
velopment of the guidance? Although sadly not always
the case, sometimes the principles that underpin the
development and, ultimately, the content of the guidance
will be openly articulated. NICE guidelines, for example,
are informed by a (publicly available) set of principles,
which were updated in January 2020 to replace its previ-
ous “values framework” [32]. Of course, NICE is not ex-
plicitly aiming to issue ethical guidance, although (as it
appears to appreciate) its work will implicitly adopt eth-
ical positions. As for those who are engaged in preparing
overtly ethical guidance, they will sometimes make their
principled commitments explicit too. The RCP’s
COVID-19 guidance, for example, explains up-front that
“The principal values that inform this guidance are that
any guidance should be accountable, inclusive, transpar-
ent, reasonable and responsive” [2]. Each value is then
outlined in the document, as well as in a column pub-
lished by the Chair [33]. Such statements can help the
reader, including in their judgment as to the quality of
the resulting guidance.5
Leaving that aside, it is worth asking what evidence
has been gathered to inform the guidance? Guidance is
likely only to be as good as the evidence that has con-
tributed to its development. Good ethics requires good
facts [35], and this can be challenging, as we have seen
in the early days of COIVD-19, when robust evidence is
not yet available. Despite the challenges, many organisa-
tions appreciate the importance of good evidence. The
Nuffield Council, for example, states that “Gathering evi-
dence is a major part of all of our projects. We thor-
oughly research each topic and consider a wide range of
views,” and they outline the various ways in which they
seek to gather evidence [30]. Similarly, NICE notes that
its “guidance and standards are underpinned by evi-
dence. So we need to ensure that this evidence is rele-
vant, reliable and robust” [32].
Of course, even robust evidence needs to be used ro-
bustly. Finally, then, one may ask how evidence has been
used to inform the guidance – in particular, how has the
evidence been assessed and analysed? Different sorts of evi-
dence might help to answer different sorts of questions; the
quality of evidence will vary; limitations should be recog-
nised; and interpretations should be clear and careful [1].
The fool, the wise person, and the need for both
judgment and guidance
More can and should be said about the range of factors
to consider, and questions to ask, of professional ethical
4As COVID-19 unfolds, there have been (understandable) concerns
raised, not only about the credentials of some of the “experts” purport-
ing to issue advice, but also about the voices that are not being heard,
including those of people with disabilities [31]. Guidance that is appro-
priately inclusive is likely to inspire more confidence than guidance
which is not. Of course, even the input and support of numerous
stakeholders can offer no absolute guarantee as to the quality of any
guidance that is produced. However, professionals might be more reas-
sured by, and should likely heed, guidance which has been prepared –
or at least endorsed – by a range of stakeholders, which takes due ac-
count of a range of pertinent perspectives and interests.
5Judgment will also be required in the application of guidance,
especially if the guidance is based on or articulates multiple substantive
or procedural principles, because these will not always point in the
same direction. This point will be very familiar to medical ethicists
[34], and has rightly been recognised in some of the guidance being
employed during the current pandemic, such as the (pre-COVID-19)
pandemic flu framework [28]. I return to the question of judgment
below.
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guidance. Although I hope there is something of value in
these remarks, what I offer here is a necessary but not
yet a fully sufficient blueprint or, indeed, a fully worked-
up guidance to guidance.
But even if we can craft such a blueprint, more will al-
ways be needed. However authoritative, applicable and
robust a piece of guidance may be, it will rarely provide
the whole answer. According to Hampton:
“Medical treatment by a wise man who depends on
an assessment of each individual patient and the ap-
plication of expertise, judgement and common
sense, will usually be preferable to a slavish applica-
tion of guidelines” ([1], p. 28).
Whether the professional in question is the “fool” or
the “wise person” that Hampton envisages, professional
judgment will always be needed, including when apply-
ing guidance for professionals.
However, this observation invites an objection: if pro-
fessionals will always be required to exercise their judg-
ment, then is there any need to have guidance or, more
specifically, to worry about which guidance (if any) they
should “pin or bin”? The interplay between judgment
and guidance is complex and merits more attention than
I can devote here. However, some preliminary remarks
can be offered about the need for both elements and
about their (symbiotic) interaction.
The need for judgment
Starting with the need for judgment, Coles observes that
this is a feature of the professional role:
“Professionals are asked to engage in complex and un-
predictable tasks on society’s behalf, and in doing so
must exercise their discretion, making judgments – de-
cid[ing] what is ‘best’ in the particular situation rather
than what is ‘right’ in some absolute sense” [36].
Even guidance that seeks to stipulate the “right” be-
haviour will tend to leave room for – indeed, require –
professional judgment as to what is “best” in the situ-
ation at hand. Guidance might not provide for every
eventuality, meaning there will be situations where the
professional will need to judge what is “best”. But such
judgments are also likely to be needed, even when the
available guidance is comprehensive, because the profes-
sional is likely to be required to discern how “best” to
translate the principles into action in their particular
situation. For example, (authoritative) guidance from the
GMC sets out the principles governing consent to treat-
ment, which notes (inter alia) that “How much informa-
tion you share with patients will vary, depending on
their individual circumstances”. ([37], para. 7) This
obviously requires a judgment to be made by the profes-
sional in the individual case. In short, however much
guidance seeks to furnish the (“right”) answer, more
work is likely to be needed in order to determine what is
“best”.
Some will nevertheless object to the need for judgment
and the lack of “answers”. Medical ethics sometimes
comes under fire in this regard. Many of us working in
the field will have encountered the complaint that, des-
pite a plethora of principles, processes, and the like,
medical ethics does not provide professionals with “the
answer”, as if this is a fair charge and a distinctive failing
of the field. The charge is not wholly fair: there are areas
in which medical ethics has converged on answers, such
as about the aforementioned importance of obtaining
consent from a patient or research participant.6 The
charge is also not peculiar to medical ethics: judgment is
also needed in other fields, including others which pur-
port to guide human behaviour. Law, for example, will
sometimes provide clear answers, but – particularly in
an adversarial legal system – there will sometimes be
different views as to what “the law” instructs, which bar-
risters will fight out in court, before a judge then – liter-
ally – makes the relevant considered judgment.
We might even be disquieted if all the “answers” were
to be provided in advance, whether by ethics, law, or
professional guidance. Coles’ reference to the “best” and
the “right” hints at a distinction between the particular
and the general. A focus on the general, in the form of
off-the-peg “answers”, might, at worst, tend towards ab-
solutism and thus towards a view of the “right”, which is
imposed on everyone, regardless of whether it is indeed
“right” or even “best” for every individual. Such a focus
risks overlooking or overwhelming the particular, and
thus the individual patient, context or decision.
This was effectively the basis of the challenge to the
NICE guidance: general guidance had not given due re-
gard to the rights and interests of those with particular
disabilities [29]. Examples like this not only reinforce the
need to ensure that guidance is appropriately informed
by stakeholders, but also remind us that general proposi-
tions might need to be tailored to the specific person,
situation or decision.
Tailoring obviously requires the exercise of judgment.
As the Chair of NICE has pointed out, even evidence-
based medicine needs professional discretion, “otherwise
doctors would have been replaced by robots long ago”
[38]. Of course, robots have in fact taken on some roles
from doctors, albeit such robots are not (yet?) fully au-
tonomous, so they do still require human control and
oversight. Indeed, tragic recent events involving the sur-
gical Da Vinci robot demonstrate that the rise of
6Albeit in different ways, with different emphases and caveats.
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robotics has not removed the need for (human) judg-
ment [39]. Other recent controversies – such as the per-
ceived “checklist” approach that was taken to the
Liverpool Care Pathway for caring for the dying – fur-
ther emphasise the more general point that deciding
what is “best” involves more than the thoughtless, mech-
anistic “application” of guidance or protocols [40].
The need for guidance
Failing to exercise judgment as to what is “best” can
therefore lead to harm. But this does not mean that the
professional is free to pick and choose what they should
do. Judgment is not formed and exercised in a vacuum,
and guidance may play an important role in informing
and constraining judgment.
Kaldjian defines clinical judgment as
“the basic skill of the physician that solves a medical
problem through data collection, development and
testing of explanatory hypotheses, and formulation
of recommendations for therapy based on those hy-
potheses” [41].
Such judgment certainly requires the application of
the professional’s knowledge, skills and experience – but
it should also be informed by ethical values. Judgment
appears to relate to the Aristotelean notion of “practical
wisdom”, the virtue which enables us to use the right
means to reach the right goals [41]. The relationship has
been characterised in different ways. Pellegrino and Tho-
masma, for example, claim that clinical judgement re-
quires practical wisdom: the ethical goals of medicine
give clinical judgment its orientation [42]. Kaldjian,
meanwhile, argues that “clinical judgement, if integrated
with goals of care and ethical reasoning, is actually a
form of practical wisdom within the specific context of
medicine” ([41], p. 560, emphasis added).
I suggested above that knowing what guidance to fol-
low will help to ensure that professionals are clear about
they are expected to do and how to do it, consistent in
their practices, and that those practices are defensible.
These two accounts of the connection with practical
wisdom shed further light on the question of defensibil-
ity, because they suggest that – in one way or another –
clinical judgment is closely entwined with ethical values.
Of course, professional ethical guidance will not neces-
sarily capture the “right” ethical values; even guidance
that has been issued by a recognised professional body,
is applicable and has resulted from a rigorous process
offers no guarantee that it is the “right” (ethical) guid-
ance. Indeed, the view taken by a professional body
might be judged to be out-of-step with (for example) the
(internal) morality of the profession or with what indi-
vidual professionals believe to be “right” [43]. But, if
nothing else, professional ethical guidance may be the
best available proxy for ensuring that professionals are
alert to, and observant of, ethical values. This may ex-
plain why one professional organisation has described
professional judgment as:
“Applying knowledge, skills and experience, in a way
that is informed by professional standards, laws and
ethical principles, to develop an opinion or decision
about what should be done to best serve clients” [44].
As this account suggests, judgment should be in-
formed – and, by extension, constrained – by (inter alia)
professional guidance.
In sum, the relationship between judgment and profes-
sional ethical guidance is complex, and no doubt deserves
further attention. For now, I hope to have indicated that
there is a symbiotic relationship between the two: not only
will judgment be needed to (for example) interpret and
apply professional ethical guidance, but so too will guidance
be needed to inform and constrain professional judgment.
Conclusion
Guidance – however detailed and robust – can therefore
inform judgment, but it cannot entirely replace it. Profes-
sionals will still be required to make hard ethical choices
about what is best in the given case, which may leave a
moral residue and, sadly, lead to moral distress [45]. At
the same time, however, judgment can and should be
aided by guidance, which should at least offer some moral
comfort and support. But here our central question
returns: how should a professional determine which spe-
cific guidance is for them i.e. when should they “pin it or
bin it”? Although the relationship between judgment and
guidance merits further exploration, my main aim here
has been to begin a discussion about the factors that
healthcare professionals should consider when deciding
which professional ethical guidance to follow.
Guidance is valuable because it can clarify professional
obligations and support consistent and defensible prac-
tice. Ideally, during a pandemic, those goals would be
met through the provision of authoritative national eth-
ical guidance for healthcare professionals, calls for which
have been increasing in the UK [15–19].7 Of course, it is
possible there might be more than one such document
7As this article was being finalised, barristers at a leading chambers, 39
Essex Chambers, announced that they had been instructed “by two
leading law firms to challenge the lack of a national framework for
treatment prioritisation, if demand for life-sustaining treatment out-
strips supply during the COVID-19 pandemic. Both claims are brought
by people who are concerned that they will be deprioritised for treat-
ment as a result of their impairments or additional health needs” [46].
Authoritative national guidance will surely follow if the case succeeds,
but, although this would address the first of the domains presented
here, the other domains would remain live concerns.
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– and this is even more likely if there is no authoritative
guidance, so other groups seek to fill the vacuum.
Whether they are confronted with one guidance docu-
ment or many, I have suggested that healthcare profes-
sionals should (at least, so far as the constraints imposed
by the current pandemic permit) consider the proven-
ance of the guidance, its applicability to their work, and
the methodology and methods by which the guidance
was produced. Hopefully, by considering these factors
and asking a series of related questions, healthcare pro-
fessionals can decide whether, in the case of the guid-
ance before them, they should bin it or pin it.
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